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International Exchange of
Information in Criminal Cases
Michael E. Tigar
Austin J. Doyle, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION
Obtaining information from abroad in criminal cases poses many of the
same problems as obtaining the defendant himself. The parallels are, with
only slight exaggeration, simply stated. A treaty that imposes reciprocal
obligations upon the signatories to render requested date is analogous to
an extradition treaty. Deportation resembles the unilateral decision of a
foreign sovereign to send data out of the country to a particular place. 1
Defendants are sometimes kidnapped across international frontiers, 2 and
information is sometimes obtained by means beneath the law, often without the consent of the sovereign from whose territory the information is
taken.
Exchange of information may implicate the concerns of more people
than a decision to render a defendant. The suspect worries, for lurking in
the records of a foreign bank may be evidence of crime strong enough to
take the government's case to the jury. For the foreign banker, a request
for information puts him in the center of a conflict between the laws that
govern bank secrecy in his country, the wishes of his depositor, and the
demands of his own and another sovereign. For the state within which the
information lies, foreign requests pose difficult problems of sovereignty
and comity. The requesting state faces similar problems, often overshadowed by an urgent desire to get the information at almost any cost.
This picture of international information exchange is beclouded when
the prosecutor or police official seeking the information decides to shortcut
official procedures. In perhaps the most famous such case, Bahamian bank
* Tigar, Buffone & Doyle, P.C., Washington, D.C. We acknowledge the assistance of John

J. Privitera, of our firm, and of many lawyers in various parts of the world who have helped
us. We cannot name many of those whose help has been essential to our efforts, because to
do so might reveal attorney-client or attorney work-product information. For the same
reasons, some references in this article to cases or procedures are set in general terms.
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secrecy laws had for years frustrated Internal Revenue Service and Justice
Department efforts to obtain financial information about Americans suspected of evading taxes through the use of offshore banking connections.
Despairing of ever convincing Bahamian officials to order bankers to disclose files to the United States authorities, enterprising government agents
waited until a Bahamian bank official was visiting Miami, burgled his hotel
room in his absence, rifled his briefcase, photographed the contents, and
then used the information obtained in a host of civil and criminal tax
cases. 3 Similar tales abound. 4 And whatever American courts may decide
about the use of evidence so obtained, the foreign government whose
secrecy laws are evaded by such means may feel that its sovereignty has
been invaded. 5
In this article, we describe some of the means by which police and
prosecutors obtain information in international criminal matters. We do
not present an exhaustive catalog; rather, we dwell upon examples of
international cooperation and conflict to illustrate the need for systematic
development of international law principles governing the interpretation
and application of treaties, and the enforcement in both the demanding
and the rendering state of rules concerning information exchange. These
rules and principles should honor expectations of privacy and confidentiality, make dear the obligations of foreign persons and entities, including
financial institutions, and ensure mutual respect for the sovereign interests
of the rendering state and the enforcement jurisdiction of the demanding
state. We consider, as cases in point and as representative examples, the
treaties of mutual assistance between the United States and Switzerland,
the use of subpoena power in the United States to reach foreign persons,
entities, and information, and the array of covert devices used by American
authorities when neither a treaty nor compulsory process promises any
assistance. 6
To put our discussion in perspective, we should identify the kinds of
criminal investigations in which international exchange of information is
likely to be useful. First, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 7 has naturally
prompted such investigations. Since the passage of the Act, Justice Department attention has focused upon a number of companies whose foreign
operations have allegedly been assisted by payments to foreign officials.
Even pre-Act foreign payments have been challenged under a number of
theories. 8 Often, these foreign payments are made by bank transfer in
countries such as Switzerland, where bank secrecy laws are thought to
provide confidentiality. If the company does not transfer funds directly to
the foreign official, but rather through intermediaries, the rights of the
bank, the intermediary, and the suspects may all be judged by different
standards. Possessed of evidence that a payment has been made, how can
the Justice Department obtain the bank records to prove its case? What
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rights to notice do the bank's customers and the suspected payor and
recipient have? When, in what country, and before what tribunal may the
rights of these parties be asserted?
Or consider the case of an American company or individual that uses
a foreign bank account, in Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, or some other
place with bank secrecy protection, perhaps for financial privacy and perhaps as a means of storing unreported income. The government, unable to
obtain this information under a treaty, serves a subpoena on an American
subsidiary or affiliate of the foreign banking institution, and simultaneously serves the American entity or individual with a demand that it consent
to release of the records. What are the rights and responsibilities of the
various parties, and before what tribunal may they assert them? If the
government is frustrated in its effort to obtain information by these means,
what risks does it run by suborning a foreign bank official, stealing the
documents in a foreign country, or otherwise resorting to self-help?
Finally, consider the case of a company executive subpoenaed to testify
before a grand jury about alleged unlawful acts by the company or a
foreign subsidary overseas. The executive invokes his privilege against
self-incrimination and is granted immunity. He persists in refusing to
testify, asserting that there remains a substantial risk of prosecution in the
foreign country, which cannot be attenuated by the United States court's
grant of immunity. How strong must the likelihood of incrimination be in
order to sustain the claim? Is it appropriate for American prosecutors to try
to persuade foreign officials to abandon their possible interest in prosecuting the executive, so as to moot the claim of "foreign self-incrimination"?
All of these cases have occurred, with nearly endless variations, over the
past several years. Let us examine them in different contexts.

TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND SWITZERLAND
Two treaties between the United States and Switzerland provide excellent
examples of bilateral information exchange agreements: 9 the income tax
treaty of 1951 and the 1973 treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters.
The tax treaty has been extensively and authoritatively discussed in several law journals, 10 and need not detain us greatly. The 1973 treaty, however, is proving to be an important and powerful weapon in the Department
of Justice arsenal, and little has been written in the United States about the
rights it does and does not confer. 11
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The Swiss Law Background
Swiss law has for some time guaranteed the privacy of banking transactions, even those of foreign depositors. The Swiss concept of privacy
extends to financial affairs, and is an integral part of certain contractual
relations, such as that between a bank and its depositors or other creditors. 12 The concern with privacy of banking relations is easy to understand: it fosters the growth of Swiss banking institutions. It provides a
neutral principle of nondisclosure that appears to reinforce the Swiss posture of diplomatic neutrality. Indeed, Nazi efforts to pursue the assets of
Jewish depositors in Switzerland led directly, as one commentator has
noted, to the enactment of criminal laws to supplement the existing civil
liability for breach of bank secrecy. 13
The Swiss Penal Code also contains provisions prohibiting disclosure of
business secrets; these provisions have been interpreted to bar disclosure
to foreign fiscal authorities. 14 Article 47 of the Swiss Federal Banking Law
provides for punishment by fine and imprisonment of a bank employee or
agent who intentionally discloses a secret entrusted to him in such capacity. 15 Solicitation of such an act is also punishable, and regulatory authorities are included in the list of persons subject to the obligation of secrecy.
Article 47 exempts from its prohibition disclosure under cantonal and
federal laws relating to the duty to testify or give evidence. To some extent
the treaties between the United States and Switzerland also override the
bank secrecy law.
In spite of its prohibitions to protect bank secrecy, Swiss law does not
elevate bankers to the status of doctors, lawyers or clergy. They have no
evidentiary privilege in civil or criminal cases to refuse relevant testimony
or documentary evidence to a Swiss federal tribunal, although some cantonal codes recognize such a privilege. In administrative matters, bankers
may generally refuse to disclose business secrets entrusted to them by
depositor-creditors. 16 This administrative protection extends to tax matters, during the assessment and civil penalty phases of a tax investigation.
When tax fraud-akin to felony tax evasion under United States law-is at
issue, the criminal procedure rules may come into play and the banker is
obliged to give evidence. 17
This necessarily brief and general recital suggests that questions of
financial disclosure implicate deep-seated concerns of Swiss authorities. It
is hardly surprising, therefore, that the bilateral treaties between the United States and Switzerland were concluded only after lengthy discussions,
and that the Swiss commentaries on the treaties have continued to stress
the limitations on production and use of evidence, returning often in
discussion to the concerns of the financial community. 18
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The Swiss-United States Income Tax Treaty
Switzerland is party to a large number of bilateral tax treaties, as well as
to the OECD tax convention. 19 The dominant purposes of these treaties
are to prevent double taxation and to protect the revenue of the signatories.
Swiss courts have held that exchange of information with respect to the
subjects covered by a tax treaty is an implicit obligation of the treaty
itself. 20 Thus, the absence of an express information exchange provision
is no bar to exchange of information relating to rights and obligations
created or defined by the treaty itself.
The Swiss income tax treaty with the United States goes farther than
any other, and contains an express provision permitting the Americans to
obtain information necessary to prevent fraud against American income
tax laws. 21 The provision, not surprisingly, has proven controversial
among financial circles in Switzerland. Swiss courts will, however, refuse
aid under the treaty if the particular American tax provision sought to be
enforced is regarded as confiscatory and hence contrary to the ordre
public. 22 But when American authorities present substantial evidence of
run-of-the-mill tax fraud schemes, the Swiss courts will give the treaty a
fair, not to say liberal, interpretation. 23
There are, in practice, a number of practical limitations upon the apparent generosity of the United States-Swiss income tax treaty. The first is
that the information collected in Switzerland is often furnished to American authorities in a form not susceptible of being introduced in evidence. 24
Thus, the American authorities may be in the position of having verified
facts that they are in no position to prove. 25
The second limitation arises from the principle of specialty, 26 which
restricts the uses to which information may be put by the demanding state.
The Swiss view has consistently been that information exchanged under
a treaty may be used only for the purposes for which it was obtained, and
in compliance with the conditions of the treaty. 27 Thus, information obtained under a general tax treaty may not be used for prosecution of fiscal
law violations, such as failure to observe reporting requirements, and
information obtained under the United States-Swiss treaty for prevention
of revenue fraud must be used strictly in accordance with the limits set out
in the treaty and not to investigate or prosecute other than tax fraud
offenses. 28
The income tax treaty, and particularly recent applications of it, 29 have
been useful to American prosecutorial interests. However, the preferential
treatment given to the United States has already caused controversy in
Switzerland. Perhaps more important, American concerns are broader than
simply selected revenue violations. With the growing federal prosecutorial
interest in white collar crime and the financial transactions of multination-
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al corporations, the Americans sought to cast a broader net by negotiating
the 1973 treaty.
The Swiss-United States Treaty on
Mutual Assistance In Criminal Matters
The Scope of the Treaty
The treaty, 30 signed in 1973, did not enter into force until January 23,
1977. Thus, there is a relatively small body of precedent about its actual
operation. In scope and function, however, it is relatively simple. A
schedule lists the offenses for which international aid may be given. These
offenses include, in addition to common law crimes, fraudulent bankruptcy, trafficking in stolen securities, falsehoods relating to the conduct of a
business, perjury, some types of obstruction of justice, 31 gambling, and
narcotics offenses.
Article 5 of the Treaty excludes, however, any offense of a political
nature, 32 antitrust offenses and tax offenses. There is, however, an important exception to Article 5: Articles 6, 7, and 8 are "Special Provisions
Concerning Organized Crime." Article 6(3) defines an "organized criminal
group" as one engaged in the systematic unlawful pursuit of monetary
gain, carried on through actual or threatened violent acts constituting
crimes in both states, and which seeks influence or affiliation with political,
labor, or employer groups. 33
When the requesting state makes a case persuasive to the "central
authority" of the requested state, that the request concerns organized
crime, and further "reasonably concludes" that the information is not
obtainable except with the cooperation of the requested state, then the
requested state shall furnish assistance through compulsory measures even
though the offenses involved are neither listed on the schedule of offenses
nor constitute a crime under the law of the requested state. 34 With respect
to income tax violations, however, the requesting state must meet a somewhat more stringent standard: it must show that the suspect is of a certain
importance in organized crime circles, that successful prosecution is unlikely without the requested assistance and that with the requested assistance there is a reasonable assurance of successful prosecution that will put
the suspect behind bars for a long enough time to have a "significant
adverse effect on the organized criminal group." 35
The treaty's field of application, then, reflects significant bargaining
about the sorts of offenses for which assistance would be available. The
organized crime provisions reflect significant concessions by the Swiss to
an American concern, but the concessions are predictably limited. Only in
organized crime cases can nonschedule offenses be the subject of cooperation, and then only if the criminal group is engaged in crimes which are
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so defined by the laws of both states. The concession on tax law violations
is the most strictly limited of all, in accordance with prior Swiss practice.
To understand the significance of the organized crime provisions of the
treaty, and the reluctance of the Swiss to implement so sweeping a departure from prior practice, one need only turn to the Swiss Federal Council's
message submitting the treaty to the Swiss Federal Assembly. 36 The Federal Council began by noting that the absence of a treaty on mutual judicial
aid seriously disrupted relations between the United States and Switzerland. The Swiss, the Council continued, strove to conclude a treaty covering all aspects of judicial aid, though it was evident that organized crime
"was in the first rank of American preoccupations." 37
By putting the organized crime provisions in the context of a larger
agreement, the Swiss evidently wanted to stress the exceptional and limited character of their concessions. The Swiss Federal Council began by
noting the dangers of organized crime to government, and referred to the
provisions of Articles 6, 7, and 8 as "intensified judicial assistance," based
upon abnormal circumstances. After stressing the exceptional character of
these provisions, the Council went on to note two significant qualifications
on their exercise. The first is the nearly unreviewable power 38 of the Swiss
federal police to determine whether the Americans have made out a case
that the acts of the suspect are within the definition of organized crime.
The Council pointed to the general language of Article 3, permitting refusal
of aid whenever the requested state feels that cooperation might prejudice
its sovereignty, security or "essential interests of a similar nature." 39 Second, the Council took pains to stress that the limited provision for assistance in organized crime income tax cases "is exceptional and cannot be
considered a first step toward the abandonment of the principle forbidding
judicial assistance for fiscal law violations." 40
In short, the text and history of the part of the treaty dealing with
organized crime lay bare some basic concerns of the parties. Prospects of
success for the current American effort to expand the treaty must, it seems
to us, be viewed with these concerns in mind.
Notice
With this background, we consider a typical case in order to illustrate the
operation of the treaty. The Department of Justice of the United States,
through the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, addresses its request to the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police.
In the Department's Division of International Judicial Assistance, a "Central Office USA" processes these requests.
The letter of request will typically contain a statement of facts and
supporting evidence thought sufficient to bring the request within the
treaty's terms. The Swiss authorities will first determine, under article 36,
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who is entitled to notice of the request. The application of article 36 is
uncomplicated when the subject of the investigation is also the depositor
in the bank from whom records are sought. The bank will receive notice
and will probably communicate with its customer if he still has an active
account. Further, there seems to be no question that a suspect, who is so
identified in a letter of request, is entitled to notice directly from the federal
police if he has or had an account with the bank from whom records are
sought. The federal police have made a practice of notifying such persons.
The problem of notice is more difficult with respect to others. If the
request pertains to an individual who simply had a transaction with a
depositor whose records are sought, that individual may not be given
notice. Article 36(3) requires notice to a "defendant," defined to include
a "suspect who is a subject of an investigation." 41 Certainly by the time
a grand jury inquiry has proceeded far enough to permit an Assistant
Attorney General to write a proper letter of request, the individual who
is named in that letter falls within this definition. However, article 36 is
limited to cases in which "the law in the requested State requires such
notice." Swiss law would certainly grant standing to a suspect to challenge
the sufficiency of the request before the federal police, 42 and to pursue
judicial review of an adverse decision. 4 Less clear is whether Swiss law
requires notice to the suspect who is not a depositor or in some other way
subject to the statutory protection of Swiss banking and economic espionage law. There are certainly strong reasons of fairness for construing
Swiss law as requiring such notice, although our inquiries have not disclosed a case in which such notice was given. 44
Another provision of the treaty also provides for notice:
Where a request under this Article pertains to a pending court proceeding,
the defendant, upon his application, may be present or represented by counsel or both, and may examine the person producing the document as to its
genuineness and admissibility. In the event the defendant elects to be present
or represented, a representative of the representing State or a state or canton
thereof may also be present and put such questions to the witness. 4
The evident purpose of this article is to satisfy admissibility requirements for certain business records that might not be received in evidence
unless the defendant had an opportunity to be present when they were
produced and authenticated. No similar provision appears in other articles,
relating to court and official records. 46
If admissibility of evidence in the United States is an important American concern, one is moved to consider whether American authorities
ought, as a matter of prudence, to advise suspects of requests under the
treaty. Article 12(2) grants the requestingstate the right to see that a suspect,
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his counsel or both are present during the execution of a request. If the
information is sought simply for a grand jury investigation, where the rules
of evidence do not generally apply, dispensing with the suspect's presence
presents no disadvantages to the American authorities under present law,
whatever one might think of the unfairness of such exclusion.
If the evidence is being gathered for trial purposes, American authorities
must consider the hearsay rule, provisions on authentication, and the
confrontation rights of the defendant. 47 While these problems will usually
be attenuated in the business records context, they may loom large in
particular cases, 48 for example, where the purported business record contains narrative matters arguably not made in the regular course of business.
Difficulties in introducing Swiss bank records into evidence in the United
States might also arise if the Swiss authorities have intervened to excise
or withhold portions of records as being subject to overriding Swiss concerns with secrecy or not producible under the request. Under Article 12
of the Treaty, these decisions are made by the Swiss, who have the right
to exclude the United States representatives and even the suspect and his
counsel from any proceedings in which such secrets might be disclosed. 49
Objections to the Request and
Judicial Review in Switzerland
Continuing with the typical processing of an American request, the Central Office will rule on any objections to the request. The Central Office,
in the course of making its decision, may receive written submissions from
those objecting, and often requests the United States Justice Department
to furnish additional information. The decision is subject to judicial review
by an affected party, just like any other administrative determination
dealing with personal rights. 50
The process of judicial review may be long and complex. The appropriate federal tribunal will probably be the first to hear the matter. These
Swiss courts have often been sympathetic to American requests under the
treaty. They have been unwilling to credit assertions that the American
request is pretextual, in the sense that information obtained ostensibly for
one purpose will in fact be used for another. The Swiss Federal Council
noted in 1981 that in the three years the treaty has been in force, there has
been no reported instance of the Americans violating the principle of
specialty, and that a party aggrieved by any such action would have the
right to invoke the protection of the Swiss courts. The Swiss courts have
been content to satisfy themselves that the request is in proper form, is
internally consistent, and that the offenses cited are among those for which
aid may be given.
If a party loses before the federal tribunal, the treaty provides some
interesting options. Article 6 of the Swiss federal law implementing the
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treaty provides for a special consultative commission with power to determine whether a request would harm the important Swiss interests referred
to above. An aggrieved party may submit this limited question to the
commission following an adverse decision of the federal tribunal. If the
commission decides adversely, the final recourse is to the Federal Council.
While it appears that there is little hope of successfully opposing a
properly-framed American request, the process of review may itself help
potential defendants. In one recent case, nearly two and one-half years
elapsed from the date of the request until final action by the Federal
Council. Of course, the conclusion of judicial review signals only the
beginning of collecting the materials requested.
The Process of Collecting the Information
The process of collection presents another set of opportunities for challenging the application of the treaty to the evidence sought by the American authorities. The production of evidence in Switzerland is supervised
by a designated examining magistrate, the same judicial official who is
typically charged with preliminary inquiries in criminal cases. The choice
of magistrate is determined by the location of the records.
Here, again, the course of events will be determined by who has notice
and who shows up to participate. The magistrate may use compulsory
process to obtain the requested information, and the American authorities
generally have the right to participate in a hearing before the magistrate
to ensure that the request is complied with and to authenticate the records
produced. The Swiss federal authorities also may participate, to ensure
procedural regularity, to assure that the documents produced are in fact
those and only those requested, and to interpose objections based either
upon the scope of the approved request or upon the terms of the treaty.
At this stage, the bank whose records are being sought is also likely to
be an active participant, even if it has not opposed federal police approval
of the request. Indeed, in some cases neither the suspect nor the depositor
has been notified of the request-the former because of an administrative
decision not to notify and the latter because it may be, for example, a
defunct entity whose current status or address cannot be found. In these
cases, the bank and its counsel have nonetheless taken an active interest
in limiting the scope of production and ensuring formal recognition of the
principle of specialty and treaty coverage.
The bank's participation is understandable, although the treaty specifically overrides any federal or cantonal law imposing an obligation of
secrecy, 51 and would appear to provide a complete defense to civil or
criminal charges of improper disclosure. The bank may well wish added
assurance that the release of its records is proper. It can obtain that assurance most easily by actively participating in the collection process. It may
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also wish to reassure its depositors, and the financial community generally,
of its interest in maintaining the secrecy of customer transactions.
Of course, if the bank's officers know of or have participated in the
conduct that is the subject of the investigation-or even fear further requests and further embarrassment-there is an added reason for participation. A treaty request might be the first stage in a government effort to
unravel a complex series of transactions. The next phase could be fought
out on a basis less likely to ensure secrecy. For example, the United States
government might, as discussed below, subpoena the information from
one of its citizens empowered to obtain it. 52
Using the Transferred Information in United States Courts
It remains to ask what problems American authorities may confront in
seeking to use the fruits of a treaty request in American courts. Article 37
purports to limit judicial review in the United States to a very few types
of treaty violations. 53 One might argue that the treaty confers no rights
on individuals except those granted by article 37, and that other violations
of the treaty may be raised only by suing in the Swiss courts or by
country-to-country negotiation and arbitration. There are reasons to
doubt that review is so limited. First, the Swiss Federal Council has recognized the right of private persons to bring an action before Swiss tribunals,
presumably under the administrative procedure law, if the information
furnished is used by the United States in violation of the principle of
speciality. This dictum is an implicit recognition that the treaty confers
individual rights; if it does, then its command should be enforceable in the
United States as well as in Switzerland. 54 United States courts have similarly recognized the rights of extradited defendants who object to being
prosecuted for crimes other than those for which they were extradited. 55
Deeper questions remain to be resolved in the administration of the
treaty. First, the treaty may place on a criminal defendant the unreasonable
burden of proving that a document obtained under the treaty is not genuine in order to sustain an objection on that ground. Article 18(6) purports
to provide for admission of any document authenticated in accordance
with article 18. One cannot object to this provision when a document is
sought for use in a "pending court proceeding," as article 18 provides for
the defendant's presence in such circumstances. However, in the more
typical case of a document obtained during an investigation which the
prosecution seeks to admit in a later proceeding, article 18 would apparently be the basis for the government arguing that the documents are admissible without the defendant ever having had the opportunity to test their
admissibility under the hearsay rule or under the authentication provisions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The last word will be that of the courts,
notwithstanding any purported restriction on judicial review. The ques-
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tion for decision will not be whether or not the treaty has been violated,
but whether the evidence meets the minimal standards of reliability demanded by the due process and confrontation clauses of the Constitution. 56
This is not a fanciful objection. Article 18 purports to establish a mechanism for authenticating documents and for establishing by testimony
under oath that they are in fact business records as that term has been
defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). While many if not most documents offered under this exception to the hearsay rule pose no problems,
the right to cross-examine the custodian of such a document in order to
determine whether it in fact meets the business records standard cannot
be done away with so easily in every case. Purported business records may
contain conclusions, statements which need to be seen in a larger context,
or other matter that disqualifies them from admission into evidence. 57 The
treaty cannot, consistent with the Constitution, resolve all such questions
in the government's favor.
The Defendant's Access to the Treaty Mechanism
There is another, more significant problem with the treaty, and that is its
one-sidedness. Only the government is given the means to override Swiss
bank secrecy laws and obtain the information it defines as necessary to the
prosecution of individuals it selects. Suppose an actual or potential defendant
should conclude, based upon demonstrable facts, that a Swiss bank's
records contained exculpatory evidence. Could he compel the Justice Department to make a request for the information? The treaty does not
provide for such a procedure, but conceivably its terms might be construed
to accommodate it.
This sort of question is hardly novel. United States law for years gave
only the government subpoena power over United States nationals who
were abroad. 58 The Supreme Court has not answered the question of
whether the statute is constitutional in allowing compulsory process to the
government only and not to a defendant. 59 Courts have divided over
whether a prosecutor may be compelled to grant immunity to a witness
shown by the defense to be essential to its case, and yet unwilling to forego
the privilege against self-incrimination. 60 The United States-Swiss Treaty
provides simply one more example of the government acquiring a right to
compel testimony and evidence without a corresponding right being accorded an actual or potential defendant.
Conclusion
In sum, the treaty has proven valuable as an investigative tool, but has yet
to be tested in the crucible of American trial practice. The treaty is a
comprehensive and-as regards states with bank and financial secrecy
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laws-pioneering effort in obtaining information for use in criminal prosecutions in the United States. One must ask, however, whether its utility
will in fact prove as great as its sponsors had hoped. It is doubtful that the
Swiss will dispense with the procedures that make using the treaty so
cumbersome; after all, many of these procedures are simply part of the
ordinary Swiss administrative procedure. American efforts to expand the
treaty into the noncriminal area face Swiss resistance.

SUBPOENAS TO UNITED STATES PERSONS CONNECTED
WITH FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The title of this section is intentionally broad and vague, for we mean to
depict a range of relationships with foreign financial institutions that may
invite government efforts to compel production of information about foreign financial transactions. Common to all the cases we will be discussing
is this: United States authorities claim sufficient direct or indirect power
over a person, natural or juridical, to compel production of evidence, and
sufficiert concern with the subject matter of the evidence to override any
potential objection based upon the law of the foreign state where the
records are located. 61
United States v. Quigg 62 provides an example. Quigg was indicted for tax
evasion. The government moved for issuance of a pretrial subpoena under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), to compel the Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce to produce certain records located in the offices of its
Bahamian subsidiary. The government also sought an order compelling
Quigg to consent that the records be produced. Canadian Imperial was
served by delivery of process to its New York agency office. The government claimed that this was sufficient service upon the parent corporation,
with headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, and upon Canadian Imperial's branches and subsidiaries throughout the world.
The court in Quigg rejected Canadian Imperial's challenge to personal
jurisdiction. Canadian Imperial is not a national or resident of the United
States, and could not be served abroad under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1783. Turning to the law relating to
domestic service, the court found that:
The subpoena power of the federal courts in criminal matters is not explicitly
conferred by statute but derives from the general grant of jurisdiction over
offenses against the United States which appears at 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 63
The court held that the subpoena power is limited by the same principles
that govern the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in civil cases. Thus, the
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test was whether Canadian Imperial's activities in the United States were
significant enough to satisfy the test set out in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington. 64 On the undisputed facts, the court found that Canadian Imperial's
activities met that test.
In Quigg, the records sought apparently resided in a branch of Canadian
Imperial in Nassau, Bahamas, and service was made upon a United States
office of Canadian Imperial that held itself out as resident agent of the same
corporate entity of which the branch was a part. Familiar personal jurisdiction reasoning led easily to the result the court reached.
Suppose, however, that the documents resided not in a branch of Canadian Imperial, but in a subsidiary corporation with headquarters in the
Bahamas. In fact, Canadian Imperial does have a subsidiary trust company
in the Bahamas, and this company no doubt numbers among its clients a
large number of Americans. Would service upon Canadian Imperial's resident agent constitute service upon the trust company? The decision would
turn upon the extent to which the parent's and the subsidiary's affairs are
intertwined, and questions of stock ownership, interlocking directors,
management, and operations would be the determining elements. Where
the parent effectively controls the operations of the subsidiary, the parent
has the effective control over the subsidiary's records that triggers the
obligation to produce. 65
In The Matter of Arawak Trust Company (Cayman), Ltd., 66 cited in Judge
Coffin's opinion in Quigg, presented another variation. Arawak is a trust
company operating in Georgetown, Grand Cayman. The company was
thought to possess records that would be helpful to a criminal investigation. A grand jury subpoena for those records was served on Marine
Midland Bank, a 28 percent stockholder of Arawak, and on a director and
a former director of Arawak in the United States. Arawak did not respond
to the subpoena, but the court declined to impose any sanction for noncompliance. Arawak's contacts with the United States were simply too
tenuous to give the court, of which the grand jury is an arm, power over
the company.
Even if a court determines that it has power over records abroad by
virtue of proper service on a United States affiliate, that does not end the
inquiry. Switzerland, the Bahamas, the Cayman islands, Panama and other
countries have bank secrecy legislation. If the bank produces the subpoenaed records, it or its employees abroad may risk criminal prosecution
or civil liability. The inquiry divides into two parts: an analysis of considerations of comity between nations, and a discussion of the privilege
against self-incrimination in the transnational setting.
Strong governmental interests are at issue in a criminal investigation.
The Supreme Court, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 67 has emphasized that evidentiary privileges that might prevail in the context of civil litigation must give
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way when the government seeks information for the purpose of prosecuting crime. Whether this governmental purpose ought to be accorded so
exalted a role as some would have it may well be questioned, and surely
a detailed statement of the need for the information ought to be required
before the question of comity may even be considered. 68 Of course, when
a criminal defendant seeks information by subpoena, his right to compulsory process arises and must be given the weight to which this constitutional guaranty is entitled. 69
The bank secrecy laws at issue speak in more or less clear terms, but as
they are presented to courts in the process of litigation over subpoenas,
their coercive and punitive aspects emerge. And however United States
authorities may grumble about foreign bank secrecy laws, they do represent the acts of sovereign powers within their own territory, and deserve
respect if only for that reason.
Some courts have avoided the problem by finding that the laws of the
foreign country would not in fact be violated by compelled production of
the records sought. 70 But where the conflict is clear, and the foreign law
unequivocally declares the records safe from process, most courts have
refused to enforce governmental subpoenas, be they grand jury or other. 71
A notable exception to the general rule of judicial caution is In Re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Field), 72 in which a Caymanian bank official who happened
to be in the United States was served with a grand jury subpoena and
refused to testify based on Caymanian bank secrecy laws. The Fifth Circuit
found that United States and Caymanian interests were directly at odds,
and set out to resolve the conflict by citing the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law. 73 The Restatement provides that when the legal systems
of two states conflict, each state should balance the respective interests at
stake. It hardly seems to authorize the courts of one state to perform the
balancing function unilaterally.
Proceeding to apply its balancing test, the Fifth Circuit was impressed
by evidence that Cayman and other foreign bank accounts were being used
to evade United States tax laws. The court also noted that even if enforcement of the subpoena were illegal, the law did not impose any constraints
on the use of illegally-obtained evidence before a grand jury. The court
found that if Caymanian authorities were investigating Mr. Field's bank,
they could use Caymanian compulsory process to do so; what difference,
the court said, could it possibly make that the investigation here was by
a foreign government?.
The Fifth Circuit's decision is wrong on a number of counts. First,
whether or not a defendant may object to the use of illegally-obtained
evidence before a grand jury is hardly relevant to the inquiry in Field. The
question there is whether Field could be compelled, with the threat of jail
for contempt, to testify even if to do so would violate the law of the place
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where he lived and worked and subject him to prosecution under that law.
This is a straightforward fifth amendment question, with some courts
suggesting a willingness to defer to a well-founded fear of prosecution
under a foreign legal system. 74 This puts the burden on American authorities to grant immunity from United States prosecution, and to obtain the
necessary assurances from the foreign sovereign. This course not only
reassures the witness, but pays decent regard to the foreign sovereign's
interest in enforcement of its own law.
Second, the easy assertion that since the Caymanian authorities could
find the information for their purposes, they ought not to care if the
Americans do so, has no foundation in logic, experience, or international
law. The Swiss bank secrecy laws yield to Swiss federal criminal investigations in most cases, but this has never meant and does not now mean that
the Swiss are therefore willing to permit foreign investigators the same
right to breach Swiss law whenever they decide it to be expedient. There
is a crucial difference between a foreign sovereign's law relating to its own
investigations, and that sovereign's attitude toward foreign investigations.
That difference in attitude is an attribute of sovereignty itself, not only the
power over one's own territory, but the exclusive right to determine the
application of the law within that territory. One trusts that Field will not
be followed. 75
Of course, the customer's consent can eliminate much of the difficulty
with foreign bank secrecy laws. If the customer is known and available,
the government may seek to compel that consent. In Quigg, the Court
analogized consent to submitting to a blood test or to fingerprinting, and
ordered the defendant to yield. The problem with forced consent is twofold: is the act of consent itself testimonial, in that it seems to concede the
existence of a foreign financial interest, which may be a link in a chain of
incriminatory evidence? Second, are the records that are sought testimonial? The answer to the first question may lie in artful drafting of the
consent, so that it is not a concession. The second question will turn upon
an analysis of the "personal" character of the records; generally, bank
records are not so personal in nature as to trigger fifth amendment protec-

tion. 76
So if the government is able in a trial setting to make the normal Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 showing of relevance and admissibility, and
in a grand jury setting to make some threshold showing of need, the
compelled consent may be a sufficient answer, as to the records that would
be available by such a means. Of course, to the extent that the rights of
parties not before the court are involved, the consent may be unavailing
to the government. 77
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THE END RUN: "KIDNAPPING" INFORMATION
The briefcase episode recited in the Introduction really happened, and has
been the basis for a Supreme Court decision, United States v. Payner. 78 In
Payner,the Court focused upon the violation of the banker's fourth amendment rights during the briefcase theft. The court held that the defendant
Payner lacked standing to complain of the violation of the rights of the
banker, a third party. In another recent case, there have been allegations
that United States investigators have induced a Caymanian police official
to come to the United States and share information with a federal grand
jury, although doing so is a violation of Caymanian law. 79
The Department of Justice has candidly and even cynically expressed
confidence that the application of rules of standing will insulate the government from application of the exclusionary rule. 80 At some point, perhaps in a case presenting even more deliberate government misconduct,
the rules of standing may be held not to restrict a defendant's right to make
a motion to suppress. But such issues of criminal procedure are not the
principal concern of this article. In analyzing these end runs, we conclude
that more emphasis should be given to the regime of secrecy that is deliberately undermined by such tactics.
Such conduct is a calculated affront to the sovereignty of a foreign state.
The briefcase episode was perhaps not so objectionable since the banker
was not waylaid until he came to the United States. However, in the same
investigation a government employee did go to the Bahamas and steal
papers from the banker's desk.
The rights being violated are arguably only the sovereign rights of the
state whose bank secrecy-and perhaps trespass-laws are disregarded.
There is no sure guide in the cases, but let us suggest paths that might be
explored. The Supreme Court, prior to extending the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 81 adopted rules designed
to prevent federal officers from avoiding their constitutional obligations by
cooperating with state police. In Elkins v. United States, 82 the Court held that
a federal defendant could move to suppress evidence obtained by state
police in violation of the fourth amendment. In Rea v. United States, 83 the
Court permitted an injunctive action against federal officers to prevent
their turning over unlawfully-obtained evidence to the state police.
Of course, in both Elkins and Rea the command being applied was that
of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, and not that
of a foreign country. A defendant or prospective defendant seeking to rely
upon Elkins and Rea would have to first assure himself that he had standing
to complain of the violation, and then argue for application of a rule
barring federal agents from profiting by violation of foreign legal rules. In
the analogous context of extradition, only the clearest violations of the
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most basic rules about obtaining the defendant's body have resulted in the
courts ruling against the government. 84
One important element of a challenge in the United States courts would
be a persuasive demonstration that the end run is a calculated and deliberate affront to the sovereignty of a foreign state. The United States regards
itself as a commercial center for the world, and is or ought to be concerned
with encouraging economic relations with other countries on a free and
equal basis. 85 The cavalier attitude of United States investigators toward
foreign secrecy laws reflects a sort of "banana republic" mentality that ill
becomes the United States in the contemporary world. More important,
perhaps, repeated or blatant American investigatory actions in bad faith
may well undercut American credibility in foreign and domestic litigation
over legitimate efforts to acquire information.
A defendant or potential defendant might also consider using the political system or judicial process in the foreign country to deter and perhaps
repair violations of that country's laws. A foreign government may be
willing to warn United States authorities that unless they are willing to use
regular procedures for obtaining information that all channels of cooperation may be blocked. Several years ago, a British police end run in Switzerland caused considerable scandal, no doubt leading to deterrent
measures. 86 United States persons with foreign banking connections have
made informal approaches to foreign governments in order to secure such
assistance in warning the Americans off.
The question of filing suit in a foreign country to secure protection
under its banking laws is beset with difficulty. The lawsuit might result in
disclosing more information than it could reasonably be expected to protect. In any event, a foreign lawsuit hardly seems a useful tool to restrain
United States investigators. It is doubtful they would be subject to service
of process by any easy means; even if they could be served, the time
required to conclude the lawsuit would probably be too long for even a
successful result to do any good.
There is some American precedent for suing agents of a foreign government who enter the United States and violate its laws, and for obtaining
longarm personal service on those agents back in their home country. 87 As
we say, the precedent is sketchy, but litigants may find it worthwhile to
seek to apply these rules in a foreign country "invaded" by American
agents.

CONCLUSIONS
The cocktail party jokes about the Swiss (or Bahamian, or Caymanian)
bank account get weaker every year, and not simply from repetition.

TRANSFERS OF EVIDENCE

79

Negotiation, compelled production and litigation over foreign financial
information have shown a dramatic increase, and continue to concern
American authorities. The lawyer planning a foreign transaction must now
consider not only the maze of bank secrecy legislation in the country
involved, but also the probable future development of legal, nonlegal and
extralegal devices for hurdling the barriers created by that legislation.
Regulation of multinational corporations requires more investigative
resources, deployed over a larger area, than any given state has available
to it. International exchange of information is therefore necessary. However, each state should recognize that its own view of economic and fiscal
propriety, while entitled to undoubted sway within its own borders, has
little if any claim to prevail over another state's view within the latter's
territory.
Moreover, one engaging in a transaction in a foreign country has a
legitimate reliance interest in the enforcement of that country's rules about
the consequences of that transaction, including disclosure of its details to
third parties. This international reliance interest is as old as the international merchant class itself.
All of this suggests that bilateral and multilateral agreements for exchange of information are preferable to the courts or prosecutors of one
state indulging their own views about the way in which the respective
interests of sovereigns should be accommodated. We are suggesting in
short that in this field as in so many others, one should strive to create
international rules, internationally conceived and enforced.

NOTES
1 See generally 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRmINAL LAW chs. 8-9 (M. Bassiouni & V.
Nanda ed. 1973) [hereinafter BAssiOuNI]; Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, E parle Soblen,
[1963] 2 Q.B. 243 (1962).
2 See generally United States ex re. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001; United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); and for a discussion of the genesis of the
illegal search, see the materials cited in 447 U.S. 733 n.5. Many Freedom of Information and
Privacy Act requests, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552A (1980), have uncovered more information about
these activities.
4 See, e.g., Payner, 447 U.S. at 733 n.5.
5 Some years ago, the Swiss press carried an account of British officials bribing two Swiss
bank employees, and the matter was apparently quite disturbing to the Swiss government.
See Meier, Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International Taxation, 7 INT'L LAw. 16, 17 n.4 (1973).
6 We write from the perspective of American lawyers, faced with demands by United
States officials and tribunals for assistance from foreign countries. We have faced these
questions in our practice and writing, and this perspective is therefore the most congenial to
ourselves and our readers. In any case, the treaties, rules of customary international law, and
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issues of municipal law and policy are remarkably alike in almost the whole of the nonsocialist world.
7 15 U.S.C. § 78 (Supp. II 1978). For a discussion of the various civil, administrative and
criminal consequences of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, see the materials in the
excellent ABA-sponsored book PARALLEL GRAND JURY AND AD miSTRAnTvE AGENCY INvESTIGATIONS 431-509 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS], and authorities there cited.
For our purposes, the most significant impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
is the criminalization of certain foreign payments by United States concerns to governments
or political party officials or candidates. The evidence of such transactions lies almost wholly
beyond the reach of ordinary domestic criminal process, particularly when one considers the
Department of Justice view that conduct of foreign subsidaries can be reached under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 by invoking the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976).
8 The Act took effect December 19,1977. Pre-Act payments have been alleged by Justice
Department officials to be frauds upon the citizens of the foreign country concerned and
therefore reachable as mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. This reading of these
statutes seems far-fetched, and there have been no litigated appellate cases testing it; some
firms have pleaded guilty or nolo contendere on such allegations. However, the Department of
Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Securities and Exchange Commission have all
investigated pre-Act payments. In the course of such investigations, a false statement about
a pre-Act payment could trigger a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, § 1621, or § 1623,
depending on the context, and obstruction of the investigation could constitute a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 or § 1510. Improper reporting of pre-Act payments could constitute a
criminal tax violation. If the payments were part of a price-fixing or bid-rigging scheme, the
government might adopt an antitrust theory. This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive,
merely to suggest the Justice Department's approaches to pre-Act cases at this writing.
9 In addition to broad-gauge general agreement, the United States has concluded a number
of mutual assistance agreements, limited to "specific investigations of mutual interest to both
countries." PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 7, at 853. A list of such agreements, and the
countries and cases to which they apply, appears id. at 853-55. These treaties provide for
transmission and review of requests by means similar to those described below.
10 See infra note 12.
11 E.g., PARALLL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 7, at 834.
12 Meier, supra note 5, at 17-20. This discussion relies upon Meier and upon Kronauer,
Information Given for Tar Purposesfrom Switzerland to Foreign Countries Especially to the United States for
the Prevention of Fraud and the Like in Relation to Certain American Tares, 30 Tax L. REv. 47 (1974).
These articles, particularly Kronauer, are an admirable summary of Swiss law and of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316
(Sept. 27, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Tax Convention].
13 Meier, supra note 5, at 17, Kronauer, supra note 12, at 64 n.72.
14 Meier, supra note 5, at 18.
15 Id. at 19 n.16 and accompanying text.
16 Id. at 21.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Kronauer, supra note 12, at 47, 55, 65 and n.76.
19 Kronauer, supra note 12, at 55-64 and Meier, supra note 5, at 26-29 contain a survey of
Swiss tax treaties.
20 Kronauer, supra note 12, at 56-57.
21 Tax Convention, supra note 12, art. 16 discussed in Kronauer, supra note 12, at 70-72.
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22 Kronauer, supra note 12, at 67-68 referring to December 19, 1966 and March 26, 1969
decisions of the Swiss Federal Tax Administrator.
23 Id. at 70-72.
24 Id. at 72-75; Meier, supra note 5, at 37.
25 Kronauer, supra note 12, at 75, notes a United States Tax Court decision, R.J. Ryan, 58
T.C. 107 (1972), appeal dismissed, 517 F. 2d 13 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973),
in which the court granted an order calling for depositions in Switzerland to confirm information obtained under the Tax Convention, supra note 12, art. 16. Kronauer expresses doubt that
the Swiss would comply with the request for assistance. We note that requests for information under the Tax Convention may trigger rights to notice and to judicial review in Switzerland, see Kronauer, supra note 12, at 76-78, similar to those available under the Mutual
Assistance Treaty discussed infra.
26 Kronauer, supra note 12, at 51.
27 Id. at 51.
28 This principle of specialty is a familiar one in the context of extradition. It has long
been a principle of customary international law that a demanding state may prosecute a
fugitive only for the offense for which he was extradited. Indeed, speciality has been recognized as of such importance in American law that a prisoner charged with a crime other than
that for which he was extradited may move to dismiss the case. United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886); see supra note 1.
29 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United StatesSwitzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (January 23, 1977). [Hereinafter cited as
Mutual Assistance Treaty.]
30 Id.
31 Article 4, para. 2 of the Mutual Assistance Treaty limits coverage to offenses that are
such under the laws of both states and are listed in the Schedule. This is the familiar principle
of double criminality or double incrimination. See BAssioum, supra note 1. An exception is made
for certain gambling offenses in the Schedule, item 26. Although obstruction of justice is
listed in the Schedule, Swiss law does not recognize obstruction as a crime to the same extent
as American law and the Swiss have refused assistance in some unsupported obstuction cases.
32 This again is a familiar principle, see BAssiou l, supra note 1, as is the exclusion of
military and conscription offenses.
33 This language should be familiar to American lawyers, as it bears some resemblance
to the definitions of organized crime and "racketeering" that abound in the legislative history
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968
(1976).
34 Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 30, arts. 6-8, spell out the special organized crime
procedures.
35 Id., art. 7, para. 2(c).
36 The message was dated August 28, 1974, though the Treaty was not approved until
July 27,1976. Message du Conseil federal a L'Assemblee federale concernant le Traite d'entraide judiciare en matiere penale conclu avec les Etas-Unis d'Amerique, August 28, 1974,
Feuille F~d~rale 1974 11582 [hereinafter Federal Council Message]. The approval date appears
in, e.g., T.I.A.S. No. 8302. All translations are the authors'.
37 Id.
38 Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 30, discussed in Federal Council Message, supra
note 36.
39 Federal Council Message, supra note 36 (referring to Mutual Assistance Treaty art. 3).
40 Id.
41 Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 30, art. 40(8).
42 Loi federale relative au traite conclu avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique sur l'entraide
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judiciare en matiere penale, 1977 1 Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances de la Conf~dration
suisse [ROLF] 17 [hereinafter cited as Loi re traite] article 16 gives to every person with "an
interest worthy of being protected" the right to intercede. Swiss law prior to the treaty, both
statutory and decisional, upholds the conclusion in the text. See Kronauer, supra note 12, at
76-78 and authorities cited; Loi federale sur la procedure administrative, as referred to in Loi
re traite, arts. 16-18. In a recent, but unpublished case, the Conseil Federal upheld the right
of suspects to intercede and obtain a decision on the merits of fulfilling a request under the
treaty. X v. Departement de justice et police, Conseil Federal, Feb. 11, 1981.
43 Loi re traite, arts. 16-18 permit judicial review at the instance of anyone with a right
to participate in the administrative process.
44 Kronauer, supra note 12, at 77 says "it seems obvious" that such interests should be
protected and, although he is speaking of the tax treaty, his observation is well taken.
Nonetheless, neither his research nor ours have uncovered any decision by a Swiss or American court interpreting either treaty to require such notice. The Swiss cases are, however, quite
definite that if a suspect finds out about the request the right to intervene is guaranteed. See
supra note 42.
45 Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 30, art. 18(5).
46 Id., arts. 16, 19.
47 FED. R. EVID. 801, 802, 803 (hearsay); 901, 902, 903 (authentication). It would be an act
of supererogation and a waste of time to rehearse the confrontation and compulsory process
issues in any detail. See, Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: Unified Theory of Evidence for
74 MICH. L. REv. (1975);
CriminalCases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1978); Westen, Compulsory Process 1I,
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. Rzv. 71 (1974).
48 The Federal Rules of Evidence withhold "self-authenticating" status from foreign
nonpublic documents, no doubt due to concerns with genuineness in such cases. See FED. R.
Evm. 902(3). The American official who obtains the documents has no personal knowledge
of their genuineness and thus cannot authenticate them. When there is a serious question
about the meaning, completeness and even accuracy of bank records obtained under the
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, it hardly seems possible that the government will be able to sustain its burden of showing the records to qualify for business records
status without calling a witness with personal knowledge who can sponsor them. Consider
a typical case in which a Swiss bank was used as a depositary for bonds held on behalf of
a defendant corporation by an agent or "middleman." The meaning and reliability of particular entries on statements of account, or upon debit or credit memoranda, are not reliably
knowable unless a percipient live witness testifies about them.
49 Such excisions would raise questions under FED. R. EviD. 106, the "rule of completeness," and also perhaps under the public trial and confrontation clauses. See United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). The Swiss are aware of some of these problems. Federal
Council Message, supra note 32, at 5.
50 Loi re traite, arts. 16-18, 1977 1 ROLF 17, 24-25.
51 Mutual Assistance Treaty, supra note 30, art. 38(3).
52 The government might also seek a waiver of confidentiality rights by such a person.
53 These are Mutual Assistance Treaty supra note 30, art. 9, para. 2 (search and seizure must
be executed according to the law of the place of execution); art. 10, para. 1 (self-incrimination
protection); art 13 (presence of suspect and counsel during certain phases); art. 18, para. 7
(exclusion from evidence of non-genuine document); art. 25, para. 1 (self-incrimination
protection); art. 26 (interrogation of persons in custody); art. 27 (safe conduct).
54 The question whether a treaty confers individual rights is decided from its history and
language. See, e.g., Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
55 United States v Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). However, an exchange of letters under
the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzer-
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land, 27 U.S.T. 2128-2138, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (January 23, 1977), states that violation of the
principle of specialty as in art. 5, para. 1, does not permit exclusion of the evidence in the
requesting state. The Swiss agree that the person has no standing to seek suppression of the
evidence in the requesting state but rather may inform the requested states and ask that it
take action. This language remains to be tested.
56 See, supra note 47.
57 See, supra note 48.
58 See Westen 73 MicH. L. REv. 71, 178 n.501 (1974).

59 See United States v. Blackmer, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). Section 1783 was amended in 1964,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976).
60 See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1077.

61 Since our article is limited to criminal investigations, we do no more than note that
similar problems to those we address may arise in civil, civil tax, securities regulation and
other non-criminal contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981)
(tax) U. S. appeal pending; SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 941 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
TP 98, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (securities regulation). It bears noting that dictum in Judge
Pollack's opinion in the latter sweeps rather broadly and discusses a number of issues relevent
to obtaining information in criminal cases.
62 81-2 T.C. 9732 (1981).
63 Id. at 88, 466-67.

64 326 U.S. 310 (1945). On the question of in personam jurisdiction, see also United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
65 See Local No. 1419, ILA, General Longshore Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Smith, 301
F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1962); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 257 (D. Del. 1979);
Standard Ins. Co. of New York v. Pittsburgh Elec. Insulation, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 185 (W.D. Pa.
1961).
66 489 F.Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
67 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
68 See In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975 (Freedman), 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir.
1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 121
U.S. 1015; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
69 See the articles by Westen, supra note 47.
70 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); First Nat'l City Bank
of New York v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
71 See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d
149 (2d Cir. 1960).
72 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
73 Limitations on Erercise of Enforcement jurisdiction.

Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state
is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of
its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as (a) vital national interests
of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent to which the
required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality
of the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF =E UNITED STATES § 40 (1962).

Rather than unilaterally balancing these interests, the court might well have insisted that
the government seek the information it wanted by letters rogatory issued under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1976). While letters rogatory are most commonly used in civil cases, see generally 8 C.
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& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2083 (1970) (regarding depositions
in foreign countries), they have been used in criminal cases. The issues of letters rogatory
would permit the foreign sovereign a voice in the determination whether particular information ought to be produced. Another way of accommodating the different interests of the two
sovereigns would be a bilateral treaty concerning a particular investigation.
74 On the foreign self-incrimination issue, see In reFederal Grand Jury Witness (Lemieux),
597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir. 1977);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan, 30 Cuam. L. REP. (BNA) 2471 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
75 But see United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) appeal pending; SEC v.
Banca Della Suizzera Italiana, 941 FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 98,346 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), supra note
61. In the latter case, Judge Pollack's opinion does speak broadly. However, the Swiss bank
in that case had knowingly penetrated American securities markets on behalf of its clients,
aware of the reporting requirements of American law in the event that a given client should
acquire more than a certain percentage of the stock of a public corporation. Under those
circumstances it is not difficult to see why Judge Pollack should say repeatedly that the bank
had itself created the necessity for the investigation in which it sought to withhold its
cooperation.
76 See generally United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981), U.S. appeal pending
(provides an excellent discussion of the privilege).
77 The FED. R. Cium. P. 17 showing referred to is that in United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D.
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